Innovative knowledge assets and economic performance: The asymmetric roles of incentives and monitoring by HE, Jinyu & WANG, Heli
Singapore Management University
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of
Business Lee Kong Chian School of Business
10-2009
Innovative knowledge assets and economic
performance: The asymmetric roles of incentives
and monitoring
Jinyu HE
Hong Kong University of Science and Technology
Heli WANG
Singapore Management University, hlwang@smu.edu.sg
DOI: https://doi.org/10.5465/AMJ.2009.44633414
Follow this and additional works at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/lkcsb_research
Part of the Strategic Management Policy Commons
This Journal Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Lee Kong Chian School of Business at Institutional Knowledge at Singapore
Management University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business by an authorized administrator
of Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University. For more information, please email libIR@smu.edu.sg.
Citation
HE, Jinyu and WANG, Heli. Innovative knowledge assets and economic performance: The asymmetric roles of incentives and
monitoring. (2009). Academy of Management Journal. 52, (5), 919-938. Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/lkcsb_research/3446
 © Academy of Management Journal
 2009, Vol. 52, No. 5, 919-938.
 INNOVATIVE KNOWLEDGE ASSETS AND ECONOMIC
 PERFORMANCE: THE ASYMMETRIC ROLES OF INCENTIVES
 AND MONITORING
 JINYU HE
 HELI C. WANG
 Hong Kong University of Science and Technology
 We posit that a firm's resource configuration constitutes a critical context for various
 corporate governance mechanisms. Although innovative knowledge assets are gener-
 ally a key determinant of a firm's economic performance, they also lead to greater
 information asymmetry among managers and owners and to the need to grant man-
 agers more discretion in making resource deployment decisions. This weakens the role
 of monitoring but increases the effectiveness of incentive mechanisms. Therefore, we
 hypothesize asymmetric moderating effects of monitoring- and incentive-based gover-
 nance mechanisms on the relationship between innovative knowledge assets and eco-
 nomic performance. Our empirical analyses provide support for the key arguments.
 A contention of the resource-based view of firms
 is that heterogeneity in their resources and capabil-
 ities can best explain performance differences
 among firms (Barney, 1986, 1991; Dierickx & Cool,
 1989; Mahoney & Pandian, 1992; Peteraf, 1993;
 Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997; Wernerfelt, 1984). A
 key proposition of this view is that resources that
 are valuable, rare, and costly to imitate or substitute
 can be sources of sustainable competitive advan-
 tage (Barney, 1991). Among various types of firm
 resources, innovative knowledge assets, because of
 their novelty, tacitness, and firm specificity, are
 often regarded as possessing such strategic charac-
 teristics, thus offering the possibility of significant
 performance advantages (Coff, 1999; Grant, 1996;
 Kogut & Zander, 1992; McGrath, Tsai, Venkatara-
 man, & MacMillan, 1996).
 However, the same characteristics of innovative
 knowledge assets that often enable them to be
 sources of performance advantages can also lead to
 high levels of information asymmetry among man-
 agers and owners; as a result, the process of deploy-
 ing these assets is potentially plagued with high
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 agency costs (i.e., costs resulting from misalign-
 ment of managers' and owners' interests). It then
 follows that corporate governance mechanisms,
 which are typically installed to channel managers'
 motivations toward the interests of a firm's owners,
 may critically affect the extent to which a firm's
 innovative knowledge can reach its full potential
 for value creation. Nevertheless, researchers in the
 reas of firm resources and innovation have gener-
 ally assumed away the corporate governance issues
 ass ciated with firms' accumulating and deploying
 innovative knowledge assets.
 On the other hand, research on corporate gover-
 na ce has mainly focused on identifying mecha-
 nisms that help reduce the agency costs resulting
 f om the conflict of interests among a firm's man-
 agers and its owners (Beatty & Zajac, 1994; Rediker
 & Seth, 1995; Zajac & Westphal, 1994). Many pre-
 vious studies have directly examined the organi-
 zational consequences of these mechanisms, in-
 cluding their impact on firms' strategic choices
 (Amihud & Lev, 1981; Baysinger, Kosnik, & Turk,
 1991; Sanders & Carpenter, 1998; Sanders & Ham-
 brick, 2007) and economic performance (Core,
 Holthausen, & Larcker, 1999; Dalton, Daily, Ell-
strand, & Johnson, 1998; Hermalin & Weisbach,
 1998). Yet, despite the extensive literature in this
 area, little research has directly examined the rela-
 tionship between corporate governance and firm
 resource configurations. This lacuna is also surpris-
 ing because managers, as a firm's decision-making
 specialists, directly control the way in which firm
 resources are deployed. Inefficient use of firm re-
 sources should thus be a key indicator of agency
 problems (Fama, 1980; Jensen, 1986). The extent to
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 which the "rent-generating" potential of a firm's
 resources is fully realized will depend on the effec-
 tiveness of its corporate governance mechanisms in
 deterring unproductive resource deployment by
 managers. A firm's resource configuration thus
 constitutes the fundamental context for evaluating
 its corporate governance, and unique challenges to
 corporate governance may arise from different re-
 source configurations.
 Therefore, in this study, we intend to bring these
 disjointed research streams together by examining
 the roles of corporate governance mechanisms in
 the efficient deployment of firm innovative knowl-
 edge assets. We emphasize that increased informa-
 tion asymmetry among a firm's managers and its
 owners, as well as the need for greater managerial
 discretion, are prominent in the process of deploy-
 ing these assets. How to effectively control the re-
 source deployment process thus can be a signifi-
 cant challenge to corporate governance. Unless
 corporate governance mechanisms are tailored to a
 firm's particular resource configuration, the perfor-
 mance advantages associated with innovative
 knowledge assets may not be fully realized.
 Firm-level corporate governance mechanisms
 mainly involve monitoring and incentives, corre-
 sponding respectively to the ideas of contract en-
 forcement and interest inducement (Zajac & West-
 phal, 1994). Researchers usually view these two
 types of mechanisms as either substitutes or com-
 plements, implying that either monitoring or incen-
 tive alignment will bring benefits to principals,
 even though the presence of one mechanism may
 either enhance or override the effect of the other
 (Rediker & Seth, 1995; Tosi, Katz, & Gomez-Mejia,
 1997; Zajac & Westphal, 1994). However, consider-
 ing that firm resource configuration is a key corpo-
 rate governance context, monitoring may not be
 effective in dealing with the governance challenges
 associated with innovative knowledge assets. Close
 monitoring by outsiders is not only ineffective for
 reducing the information asymmetry among man-
 agers and owners; it may even become counterpro-
 ductive, as it will tend to constrain managerial
 discretion, which is necessary for the efficient de-
 ployment of a firm's innovative knowledge assets.
 In contrast, high levels of information asymmetry
 among managers and owners are likely to increase
 the effectiveness of incentive alignment. Thus, the
 roles of the two broad governance mechanisms,
 monitoring and incentives, may be asymmetric in
 dealing with the agency concerns associated with
 deploying innovative knowledge assets.
 This article is an attempt to make several contri-
 butions to the literature. First, by arguing that a
 firm's resource configuration is a key context for
 understanding the role of corporate governance, we
 expand the conting ncy view of corporate gover-
nance mechanisms, which has primarily focused
 on risk and strategic com lexity as the key con-
 tingencies (Zajac & Westphal, 1994). Second, al-
 though different governance mechanisms are
 generally considered to be substitutes or comple-
 ments (Rediker & Seth, 1995; Tosi et al., 1997; Zajac
 & Westphal, 1994), we emphasize their asymmetry
 here, providing a  alternative view that has b en
 overlooked in previous governanc  research. Third,
 this study is one of the first to examine how corpo-
 rate governance and firm resources jointly affect a
 firm's economic pe formance, an approach th t
 scholars holding the resource-based view of the
 firm have suggested as highly necessary and prom-
 ising (Go tschalg & Z llo, 2007; Makadok, 2003;
 Wang & Barney, 2006).
 BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES
 Innovative Knowledge Assets and Firm
 Economic Performance
 According to the resource-based view of the firm,
 performance differences among firms can best be
 explained by differences in the value, rarity, inimi-
 tability, and nonsubstitutability of their resources
 (Barney, 1991). A central argument of the knowl-
 edge-based view of the firm, an extension of the
 resource-based view, is that differences in the
 knowledge bases and innovative capabilities of dif-
 ferent firms are the main determinants of differ-
 ences in their performance (Grant, 1996; Kogut &
 Zander, 1992). Among various types of firm knowl-
 edge, innovative knowledge assets, which may in-
 clude information, know-how, and technologies
 that help a firm improve its product effectiveness
 and process efficiency, have the very characteris-
 tics of resources that are able to bring superior
 performance to a firm (Hoetker & Agarwal, 2007;
 McGrath et al., 1996).
 Because the efficient operation of a firm requires
 congruence between the firm's product and knowl-
 edge domains (Grant, 1996), a strong innovative
 knowledge base can increase a firm's rent genera-
 tion potential by strengthening its ability to take
 advantage of opportunities in product markets (Go-
 palakrishnan, 2000). Also, innovation in the form
 of a unique and superior combination of firm re-
 sources may introduce "creative destruction" to the
 competitive landscape and bring considerable ben-
 efits to the innovating firm (Schumpeter, 1934).
 Innovation can thus be a fundamental force that
 drives a firm's exploitation and exploration in the
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 marketplace, resulting in positive economic perfor-
 ance for the firm (Griliches, 1990; Hall, 2000).
 Usually, intensive investment in R&D can help a
 firm maintain an ample stock of innovative knowl-
 edge assets, which are often traceable, at least in
 part, through the firm's patenting history (Hoetker
 & Agarwal, 2007). Although rival firms may imitate
 certain codifiable but nonpatented innovative out-
 puts, often much of a firm's innovative knowledge
 can be an "isolating mechanism" deterring rivals
 from appropriating economic returns through imi-
 tation (Mahoney & Pandian, 1992; Rumelt, 1984).
 The difficulty in imitating a firm's innovative
 knowledge is apparent from both the process of
 accumulating innovative knowledge and that of ap-
 plying such knowledge toward productive use.
 First, the process of accumulating innovative
 knowledge is usually highly path (history) depen-
 dent and firm specific (Dierickx & Cool, 1989; Hel-
 fat, 1994). As a result, innovative knowledge is
 often tacit and idiosyncratic (Zander & Kogut,
 1995). Most innovative knowledge assets are accu-
 mulated internally, over time, through routinized
 organizational mechanis s (Nelson & Winter,
 1982) that help prevent value appropriation by po-
 tential imitators. Also, a continuous focus on accu-
 mulating innovative knowledge assets increases a
 firm's absorptive capacity, putting it in a better
 position to transform strategic inputs into valuable
 products or services (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Kor
 & Mahoney, 2005).
 Second, the outcome of innovative knowledge
 can also prove difficult for other firms to imitate.
 Apart from protective mechanisms such as copy-
 rights and patents, the idiosyncratic features of a
 firm make replication difficult if other firms do not
 have access to the asset configuration to which the
 innovative knowledge was applied (Helfat, 1994).
 Moreover, innovative knowledge assets can also
 provide superior insight and access with regard to
 firm-specific investment opportunities, as other
 fir s may not have full information about the po-
 tential value of such investments (Alchian & Dem-
 setz, 1972; McGrath et al., 1996).
 In line with these arguments, previous empirical
 studies (DeCarolis & Deeds, 1999; D'Esté, 2005;
 Geroski, Machin, & Van Reenen, 1993; Roberts &
 Amit, 2003) have generally demonstrated that vari-
 ations among firms in their rates of accumulating
 new knowledge, and in their stocks of innovative
 knowledge assets, contribute to differences in the
 financial performance of these firms. For example,
 using a sample of U.S. biotechnology firms, De-
 Carolis and Deeds (1999) found that both stocks
 and flows of organizational knowledge had a posi-
 tive impact on firm performance. Research has
 shown similar positive effects of innovative inputs
 and outputs on performance in various other geo-
 graphical and industrial settings, such as Austra-
 lian retail ba king (Roberts & Amit, 2003), Spanish
 Pharmaceuticals (D'Esté, 2005), and U.K. manufac-
 turing (Geroski et al., 1993). Therefore, to facilitate
 further discussion on the role of corporate gover-
 nance mechanisms in the deployment of firm inno-
 vative knowledge assets, we first submit the follow-
 ing baseline hypothesis:
 Hypothesis 1. Ceteris paribus, a firm's level of
 innovative knowledge assets is positively re-
 lated to its economic performance.
 Governance Challenges for Innovative Firms and
 Possible Solutions
 Although a firm's knowledge base is often widely
 distributed through its entire workforce, the CEO
 and other top managers usually play a critical role
 in guiding the allocation, recombination, and ex-
 ploitation of innovative resources (Castanias & Hel-
 fat, 1991, 2001; McGrath et al., 1996). "As resources
 devoted to innovation increase, the potential im-
 pact of the CEO on a firm's relative success or
 failure also increases" (Balkin, Markman, & Gomez-
 Mejia, 2000: 1119). Top managers' intimate experi-
 ence with the firm's products and technologies is
 often highly valuable for managing the complexity
 and ambiguity associated with the deployment of
 innovative knowledge resources (Kor & Mahoney,
 2005). Moreover, top managers' tacit knowledge of
 key employees' expertise and interests can help the
 firm match its limited financial and human re-
 sources more productively with its innovative
 knowledge base. As Coff explained,
 He/she must organize and coordinate mployees to
 generate rent in the context of causal ambiguity,
 social complexity, and tacit knowledge - a formida-
 ble task. The manager must develop systems that
 mitigate the information dilemmas associated with
 strategic resources. This includes identifying key
 complementary skills, making decisions under ex-
 treme ambiguity, and retaining people who are cen-
 tral to rent-generating capabilities. (1999: 123)
 Therefore, although the detailed technical aspects
 of a firm's knowledge stock may be embodied in
 individual employees, transferring that knowledge
 into competitive advantage requires highly firm
 specific management skills and largely remains un-
 der the influence of top managers.
 On the other hand, according to agency theory
 (Fama, 1980; Jensen & Meckling, 1976), in the ab-
 sence of appropriate corporate governance mecha-
 nisms, managers may engage in actions that deviate
 922 Academy of Management Journal October
 from the enhancement of firm value and share-
 holder wealth, diverting firm resources toward in-
 efficient investments or away from investments
 that are needed (Seth, 2004). Examples include
 managers' pursuit of pet projects, overspending on
 advertising, suboptimal investment in product de-
 velopment, and shirking (Gomez-Mejia, Larraza-
 Kintana, & Makri, 2003). Thus, appropriate cor-
 porate governance mechanisms should channel
 managerial effort toward efficient deployment of
 resources. In this sense, corporate governance can
 be viewed as a "valve" installed to channel the flow
 of firm knowledge assets toward efficient deploy-
 ments. Conversely, inappropriate governance
 mechanisms can hinder the efficient deployment of
 knowledge assets by misaligning managers' inter-
 ests or by inappropriately constraining their deci-
 sion making.
 Two critical features of innovation-intensive
 firms are predominantly relevant to the erection of
 appropriate corporate governance mechanisms: (1)
 there is often a high degree of information asym-
 metry between owners and managers with regard to
 efficient ways to create value from a firm's re-
 sources, and (2) substantial managerial discretion
 is needed for making decisions about the deploy-
 ment of innovative knowledge assets. Although the
 extent of information asymmetry and managerial
 discretion is generally not directly observable,
 these underlying concepts have important implica-
 tions for understanding the effectiveness of various
 corporate governance mechanisms in firms with
 high levels of innovative knowledge assets.
 Information asymmetry is usually considered a
 key source of agency problems. Managerial oppor-
 tunism is more likely when a principal has little
 reliable information with which to evaluate an
 agent's motivation and ability to serve the princi-
 pal's interests, as well as the appropriateness of the
 agent's decisions (Eisenhardt, 1985; Ouchi, 1980).
 The owners, as outsiders to the resource deploy-
 ment process, normally do not have the firm-spe-
 cific information and skills that top managers have,
 including their intimate experience with a firm's
 products and technologies and their knowledge of
 key employees' expertise and interests (Kor & Ma-
 honey, 2005). Although, in general, owners can use
 various signals or "surveillance mechanisms"
 (Eisenhardt, 1985), such as the intensity of R&D
 activity, product launches, and short-term financial
 consequences, to evaluate managers' decisions and
 performance, for firms with high levels of innova-
 tive knowledge, such signals are likely to be rather
 noisy (Balkin et al., 2000; Gomez-Mejia et al.,
 2003). The same tacitness, path dependency, and
 firm specificity that make innovative knowledge a
 promising source of superior performance can also
 challenge firm owners in interpreting these typical
 signals.
 Information asymmetry also increases the need
 for managerial discretion in innovation-intensive
 firms. In the management literature, managerial
 discretion refers to the "latitude of actions" that
 allows managers to choose from a wide range of
 strategic options in deploying firm resources (Ham-
 brick & Finkelstein, 1987; Shen & Cho, 2005). Such
 discretion is particularly important in firms with
 high levels of innovative knowledge assets because
 of the ambiguity in decision making prevalent in
 such firms. As Hambrick explained, managerial
 discretion is likely to be important "when means-
 ends ambiguity is great, that is, when there are
 multiple plausible alternatives" (2005: 119). This
 describes innovation-intensive firms, in which it is
 often necessary for top managers to have substan-
 tial lexibility and power in decision making.
 But from the agency-theoretic perspective, such
 greater latitude in decision making also gives man-
 agers more freedom to pursue self-interested agen-
 das (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2003; Jensen & Meckling,
 1976; Shen & Cho, 2005). Therefore, the challenge
 is to grant managers sufficient discretion to make
 strategic decisions that facilitate the efficient de-
 ployment of a firm's innovative knowledge while
 limiting their motivation to pursue self-interested
 go ls at the owners' expense. Solutions normally
 ely on two fundamental mechanisms of corporate
governance: monitoring and incentives (Rediker &
 Seth, 1995; Tosi et al., 1997; Zajac & Westphal, 1994).
 In the sections that follow, we develop the argument
 that incentives are often the more suitable mecha-
 nism in an innovative environment, where overreli-
 ance on monitoring may hinder the full exploitation
 of a firm's innovative knowledge assets.
 Innovative knowledge assets and monitoring.
 Monitoring refers to "observation of an agent's ef-
 fort or outcomes that is accomplished through su-
 pervision, accounting controls, and other devices"
 (Tosi et al., 1997: 588). Monitors oversee the activ-
 ities of top managers to ensure they behave in a way
 that is consistent with the interest of the owners.
 But monitoring is not without costs, because mon-
 itors must collect, process, and analyze the infor-
 mation they need. Indeed, monitoring costs can be
 prohibitively high if the monitors have great diffi-
 culty in observing specific decision-making and
 implementation processes and, moreover, in inter-
 preting what they observe.
 Success in monitoring thus depends on the in-
 formation characteristics of the specific manage-
 ment task that is to be monitored (Coff, 1999). In-
 formation asymmetry becomes particularly acute
 when the task involves deploying a firm's innova-
 tive knowledge. The firm-specific and ambiguous
 nature of strategy formulation and implementation
 in such a context challenges monitors to find clear
 signals or indicators that can reliably assess man-
 agement's effort and performance (Baysinger &
 Hoskisson, 1990). Furthermore, not only will mon-
 itoring be more expensive and less effective in
 highly innovative firms, but also, close monitoring
 may do more harm than good. Monitoring in inno-
 vation-intensive firms is inevitably based on lim-
 ited information, poor assessment of managerial
 behavior, or myopic financial criteria. These limi-
 tations can make monitoring into counterproduc-
 tive interference that negatively affects the quality
 of managers' decisions (Burkart, Gromb, & Panunzi,
 1997). In such situations, excessive monitoring may
 inhibit managers from exercising the discretion nec-
 essary for effective strategy formulation and imple-
 mentation. Therefore, instead of monitoring manag-
 ers closely, it is sometimes preferable to grant them
 much discretion in making resource deployment de-
 cisions (Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987).
 In modern corporations, it is primarily the boards
 of directors (Demsetz & Lehn, 1985) and large
 shareholders (Rediker & Seth, 1995; Zajac & West-
 phal, 1994) who monitor the top managers. In the
 case of a board of directors, nonexecutive outsider
 representation is generally considered a key force
 for effective monitoring, mainly because "outside
 directors" have fewer conflicts of interest than "in-
 side directors" and may be better able to objectively
 assess managers' strategy and performance (Fama,
 1980). However, such monitoring may be less effec-
 tive in a highly innovative firm because of the high
 information asymmetry between the top managers
 and outsiders and the prohibitive cost of outsiders
 reducing such asymmetry. Having more insiders on
 the board, on the other hand, can preserve some of
 the managerial discretion necessary for optimum
 value creation from knowledge assets (Hambrick &
 Finkelstein, 1987). In addition, more insiders can
 help reduce the information asymmetry among top
 managers and the board (Aguilera, 2005; Baysinger
 & Hoskisson, 1990). As Baysinger and Hoskisson
 pointed out, "Insiders, because they are partici-
 pants in the decision processes, have access to in-
 formation that is relevant to assessing managerial
 competence and the strategic desirability of initia-
 tives, regardless of their short-run or long-run per-
 formance outcomes" (1990: 77).
 For similar reasons, other forms of monitoring,
 such as that by large outside shareholders, who
 have conventionally been considered guardians of
 firm resources (Demsetz & Lehn, 1985; Hartzell &
 Starks, 2003), may also have little or even a nega-
 tive impact on the deployment of innovative re-
 sources toward value creation. Although large
 outside shareholders have a strong interest in
 maximizing the value of their investments, their
 lack of firm-specific information with regard to the
 often-ambiguous process of creating value from in-
 novative knowledge assets may limit their ability to
 play a constructive role. Thus, monitoring by large
 outside shareholders based on noisy signals may in
 fact result in much counterproductive interference.
 Another structural arrangement often considered
 relevant to the actual degree of monitoring is CEO
 duality, which occurs when a firm's CEO also
 chairs its board of directors. Generally speaking, if
 a CEO is also chairperson, a board's monitoring role
 will be compromised, as it will be easier for the
 CEO to entrench other members of the board (Boyd,
 1995; Finkelstein & D'Aveni, 1994). However, for
 firms with high levels of innovative knowledge,
 CEO duality may bring benefits, as such an ar-
 rangement eliminates from the leadership struc-
 ture a potential source of unnecessary interference
 (Finkelstein & D'Aveni, 1994). The unity of com-
 mand that is associated with unified leadership may
 thus become desirable, as the CEO-chairperson can
 more effectively implement assertive decisions based
 on his or her professional judgment of the most pro-
 ductive use of the firm's knowledge assets.
 In summary, governance arrangements intended
 to facilitate monitoring, such as outsider represen-
 tation on a board and the presence of large outside
 shareholders, may not be suitable for innovation-
 intensive firms. Such mechanisms are likely to be
 ineffective or even counterproductive for such
 firms. Similarly, separation of the CEO and chair-
 person positions (i.e., the opposite of CEO duality)
 is usually associated with a high degree of moni-
 toring and thus is also expected to negatively influ-
 ence the deployment of innovative knowledge as-
 sets. We therefore propose:
 Hypothesis 2. Monitoring governance mecha-
 nisms, including the presence of large outside
 shareholders, outsiders on a board, and sepa-
 ration of the CEO and chairperson positions,
 dampen the relationship between a firm's in-
 novative knowledge assets and economic
 performance.
 Innovative knowledge assets and incentives.
 According to agency theory, incentive-based gover-
 nance motivates managers to serve owners' inter-
 ests by directly linking the managers' personal
 gains with a firm's performance. Appropriate finan-
 cial incentives can forge a common economic bond
 between managers and shareholders (Jensen &
 Meckling, 1976), thus motivating managers to de-
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 vote their best efforts to improving a firm's short-
 term and long-term performance. Managerial eq-
 uity ownership and managerial compensation
 contingent on firm performance are the two most
 prevalent examples of incentive-based corporate
 governance mechanisms (Beatty & Zajac, 1994;
 Zajac & Westphal, 1994). As discussed earlier, in
 firms with high levels of innovative knowledge as-
 sets, monitoring by external forces can prove to be
 ineffective or even counterproductive. Appropriate
 incentives are thus necessary to encourage manag-
 ers to watch their own behavior in a way that ben-
 efits both themselves and their firm's owners
 (Balkin et al., 2000; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2003). In-
 centive-based mechanisms are therefore of greater
 importance in a governance context featuring high
 levels of innovative knowledge assets.
 In addition, from the perspective of property
 rights (Demsetz, 1967; Libecap, 1989), linking man-
 agerial financial gain to firm performance - espe-
 cially in the form of equity ownership rights - is
 particularly meaningful for innovating firms. Be-
 cause innovation processes are highly firm specific
 and path dependent, firms often have heterogeneous
 stocks of innovative knowledge assets (Hoetker &
 Agarwal, 2007). This heterogeneity often requires top
 managers to make significant firm-specific human
 capital investments that have limited value in the
 general labor market (Castanias & Helfat, 1991; Zin-
 gales, 2000). In such situations, equity ownership
 rights represent residual rights of control, which
 can give managers some bargaining power with
 respect to the distribution of rents and motivate
 them to invest in developing firm-specific "human
 capital" in the most productive way (Grossman &
 Hart, 1986; Hart & Moore, 1990; Hartzell & Starks,
 2003). Moreover, residual rights of control by top
 managers can increase the level of permissible
 managerial discretion, which can further facilitate
 rent generation from innovative knowledge assets.
 We ought to note, however, that incentive-based
 governance also has its costs. Compensating man-
 agers using stock options, for example, may lead to
 excessive risk taking, as managers are more likely
 to bet firm resources into big losses, being moti-
 vated by unlimited upside profit but minimal
 downside potential for option holders (Sanders,
 2001; Sanders & Hambrick, 2007). In addition,
 managers with performance-based pay and large
 share holdings may attempt to manipulate short-
 term performance measures and their firm's stock
 price to increase their own wealth at the expense of
 long-term shareholder benefits (Zahra, Priem, &
 Rasheed, 2005). These arguments suggest that in-
 centive-based corporate governance does not per-
 fectly solve all the agency problems in firms. Its use
 should thus require great caution and complemen-
 tary control. This need may also explain why, in
 general, firms often adopt monitoring and incen-
 tive-alignment mechanisms simultaneously.
 However, because of the inefficacy of monitor-
 ing-based governance in these firms, as well as the
 greater need for them to enlist managers' firm-spe-
 cific human capital investments, shareholders of
 highly innovative firms may still find it beneficial
 to rely heavily on incentive-based compensation
 contracts, despite their potential costs. In contexts
 with high levels of innovative knowledge assets, as
 the benefits of exploring wealth-creating opportu-
 nities are likely to be high for both a firm and its top
 managers, managers may be more motivated to re-
 spond to incentive-based governance by devoting
 themselves to the efficient deployment of these in-
 novative assets (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2003). On the
 other hand, in less-innovative contexts, where such
 wealth-creating opportunities are less apparent,
 managers might be more likely to respond inappro-
 priately to incentive-based pay schemes by, for ex-
 ample, taking on excessive risk in the case of stock
 option plans (Sanders & Hambrick, 2007). They
 may also be more likely to indulge in other forms of
 misconduct, such as accounting manipulation. In-
 deed, technology-oriented and innovative start-up
 companies often rely heavily on stock options as a
 form of compensation for their top managers (Kim
 & Nofsinger, 2007).
 Because a CEO plays a key role among a firm's
 top managers, and because CEO compensation usu-
 ally mirrors the incentives provided to managers
 and other employees (Balkin et al., 2000), it may be
 appropriate to focus on the incentives provided to
 CEOs when examining the effects of incentive-
 based governance. Considering both the benefits
 and potential costs of incentive-based governance
 m chanisms, we propose the following:
 Hypothesis 3. Incentive-based corporate gover-
 nance mechanisms, including equity owner-
 ship by a firm's CEO and CEO contingency
 pay (i.e., the components of CEO compensa-
 tion that are directly related to firm value)
 strengthen the relationship between a firm's
 innovative knowledge assets and its economic
 performance.
 RESEARCH SETTING AND METHODS
 Data and Sample
 We combined U.S. patent data and several
 Standard & Poor's COMPUSTAT data sets, in-
 cluding Industrial Annual, Executive Compensa-
 tion, Blockholders, and IRRC's Directors data, to
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 test our hypotheses. To keep the industry back-
 grounds comparable while not losing too much
 generality, we included data on manufacturing
 firms with four-digit SIC codes ranging from 2000
 to 3999 in the analysis. We focused on manufactur-
 ing firms because technology competition and pat-
 enting, which reflect the level of firm innovative
 knowledge assets, are more important in manufac-
 turing than in service firms. Thus, we began our
 sample selection with the group of firms in manu-
 facturing industries that were listed simulta-
 neously in the COMPUSTAT Executive Compensa-
 tion (ExecuCom), Blockholders, and IRRC board
 composition data sets. The former is a database on
 executive compensation covering 2,698 companies
 from 1992 to 2005. The latter two data sets contain
 standardized data about blockholders and board
 composition that start in 1996. To increase the final
 sample size, we additionally extracted blockhold-
 ers and board composition data for the years 1994
 and 1995 based on firms' proxy statements.
 Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2001) created a data
 file with detailed information on almost 3 million
 U.S. patents granted between 1963 and 1999 and on
 over 16 million citations of these patents granted
 between 1975 and 1999. We used this data set to
 construct our patent-based measures of firm innova-
 tive knowledge assets. Because our unit of analysis
 was the firm, we aggregated the patents and their
 citation counts to the firm level (Rosenkopf & Nerkar,
 2001). In addition, we extracted R&D expenditure as
 well as other firm and industry information from
 COMPUSTAT's Industrial Annual data.
 Since each data set spanned several years, we
 were able to construct a panel data set based on the
 overlapping periods. As a result, the total number
 of observations used for analysis was 736 for the
 data period 1994-99. When we used the lagged
 structure in the two-stage models, our final sample
 in the second-stage model, consisting of 215 firms
 and 546 firm-year observations, covered the period
 1996-99. Of the 215 firms, 49 had four years of
 observations, and 73 had three years. The rest of the
 firms (93 of them) had observations for either one
 or two years.
 Measurements
 Firm economic performance. Following the lead
 of previous studies (Griliches, 1990; Hall, 2000;
 Jaffe, Trajtenberg, & Henderson, 1993), we used
 market value to represent each firm's economic
 performance (Montgomery & Wernerfelt, 1988).
 Unlike return on assets, the market value of a firm
 is forward looking, as it incorporates stock market
 expectations about future returns. It thus better
 captures a firm's financial performance when long-
 term investments such as R&D expenditures are
 crucial to evaluating the firm's performance and
 the bias of accounting measures is likely to be se-
 vere (Lindenberg & Ross, 1981; Ross, 1983). We
 further adjusted the measure by the book value of a
 firm's total assets. Thus, our proxy for economic
 performance was the market-to-book ratio, in
 which the market value numerator was the year-
 end market value of a firm's common stock plus the
 book value of its preferred stock and debt, and the
 book value denominator was year-end total assets.
 Furthermore, following previous studies (Griliches,
 1981; Hall, Jaffe, & Trajtenberg, 2005; Hirsch &
 Seaks, 1993), we conducted a logarithm transfor-
 mation of market-to-book value. As Hirsch and
 Seaks explained, one key theoretical rationale for
 the logarithm transformation is that "intangible
 capital has a fixed cost and thus is likely to have
 multiplicative rather than additive effects on
 value" (1993: 382). In addition, the estimation
 equation with a logarithm transformation might be
 preferable to the linear form because the former
 "dampens the influence of observations with ex-
 treme and mismeasured values" (Hirsch & Seaks,
 1993: 382).
 Innovative knowledge assets. To capture a
 firm's level of innovative knowledge assets, we first
 constructed a patent-citation-based measure. Spe-
 cifically, we employed the total citations of the
 cumulative numbers of patents that a firm pos-
 sessed. Previous studies have shown that patent
 citations are a better measure of the level of a firm's
 innovative knowledge assets than a simple patent
 count (Hall, 2000).
 On the other hand, patented knowledge may rep-
 resent only a subset of a firm's innovative knowl-
 edge assets (Tabak & Barr, 1998). To mitigate this
 concern, we employed R&D intensity as an alterna-
 tive proxy for innovative knowledge assets. Previ-
 ous studies (Griliches, 1990; Jaffe et al., 1993) have
 treated investment in R&D as an innovation input
 and an important determinant of the intangible
 component of market value. Thus, we expected
 investment in R&D to positively contribute to the
 output or stock of a firm's innovative knowledge
 assets (DeCarolis & Deeds, 1999). To obtain this
 measure, we scaled each firm's yearly R&D expen-
diture by the firm's total assets.1
 1 We also conducted robustness tests by using a com-
 posite measure of firm innovative knowledge assets
 based on both R&D expenditures and patent citations
 (Balkin et al., 2000) and by including R&D expenditures
 simply as a control variable in models with patent cita-
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 In addition, the resource-based view of the firm
 also emphasizes that firm-specific knowledge is
 particularly important for helping a firm sustain its
 competitive advantage (Helfat, 1994; Henderson &
 Cockburn, 1994). This is because firm-specific
 knowledge, which by definition is not perfectly
 déployable in other firms, effectively prevents ri-
 vals from appropriating innovation rents through
 imitation (Mahoney & Pandian, 1992; Rumelt,
 1984). However, when a high proportion of a firm's
 knowledge assets is firm specific, the information
 asymmetry among managers and owners is also
 likely to increase. In addition, greater managerial
 discretion will be necessary when managers make
 strategic decisions with regard to the deployment
 of firm-specific knowledge assets. Thus, the coun-
 terproductive effects of monitoring-based gover-
 nance and the benefits of incentive-based gover-
 nance will be more apparent for firms with high
 levels of firm-specific innovative knowledge.
 Therefore, we constructed a measure of firm-spe-
 cific innovative knowledge assets by taking further
 advantage of the patent citation data. If patents
 represent knowledge creation, and patent citations
 represent knowledge flows and subsequent impact
 (Jaffe et al., 1993), a firm's citing its own previous
 patents indicates the degree to which the pat-
 ented knowledge is economically valued inter-
 nally (Hoetker & Agarwal, 2007). Therefore, on the
 basis of patent citation data from 1975 to 1999, we
 derived a proxy for the level of firm-specific inno-
 vative knowledge using the percentage of prior
 patent citations that were self-citations. This mea-
 sure was further scaled by the overall frequency of
 those patents' being subsequently cited by the focal
 company vis-à-vis by other companies:
 Firm-specific innovative knowledge = focal firm's
 self-citations as a percentage of all its patent cita-
 tions X focal firm's citations of prior self-citations as
 a percentage of all the citations of focal firm's
 self-citations.
 We added the third factor, specifying the extent to
 which a firm subsequently self-cites its previously
 self-cited patents, to take into account the firm
 specificity of the firm's prior patented knowledge.
 A firm may cite its own previous patents, but if
 these previous patents are also widely cited by
 other firms (which will make the weight very
 small), the degree of firm specificity in the
 knowledge should be discounted.2
 Corporate governance variables. We adopted
 three measures of monitoring mechanisms that pre-
 vious researchers have widely employed in empir-
 ical governance studies (Dalton et al., 1998; Rediker
 & Seth, 1995; Zahra & Pearce, 1989; Zajac & West-
 phal, 1994). These were outsider representation on
 the board of directors, the presence of large outside
 blockholders, and CEO duality. Following previous
 studies, we measured outsider representation on
 the board by the percentage of independent outside
 directors. We measured the presence of large out-
 sider blockholders by the percentage of shares held
 by outside shareholders with greater than 5 percent
 shareholding. CEO duality was a dummy variable
 set equal to 1 when a firm's CEO also chaired the
 board of directors.
 We measured two important aspects of incentive-
 based corporate governance: CEO equity ownership
 and CEO contingency pay (Miller, Wiseman, & Go-
 mez-Mejia, 2002; O'Connor, Priem, Coombs, & Gil-
 ley, 2006; Rediker & Seth, 1995). We measured CEO
 equity ownership as the shares of a company's
 common stock held by its CEO. We measured CEO
 contingency pay as the proportion of bonuses, long-
 term incentive payments, and stock options in the
 CEO's total compensation (Miller et al., 2002).
 Other control variables. We included firm size,
 firm age, advertising expenditure, debt ratio, and
 CEO tenure as control variables, as these variables
 are often thought to also have performance impli-
 cations. Previous research has established that firm
 size plays an important role in explaining market
 returns. The natural logarithm of the total number
 of employees was our proxy for firm size (Judge &
 Zeithaml, 1992; Tuschke & Sanders, 2003), given
 the evident positive skewness in this variable. Firm
 age, as measured by the number of years since a
 firm's initial public offering, may influence finan-
 cial performance because it captures differences in
 competitiveness and agency conflicts associated
 with history (Claessens & Djankov, 1999). Advertis-
 ing intensity reflects a firm's brand assets, a critical
 intangible resource that contributes to a firm's mar-
 ket value (Batra, Lehmann, Burke, & Jae, 1995; Kor
 & Mahoney, 2005). We measured advertising inten-
 sity similarly to R&D intensity, scaling each firm's
 yearly advertising expenditure by the firm's total
 assets. In addition, corporate governance research
 suggests that leverage (the debt ratio) affects agency
 costs and thereby influences firm performance
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 tions as the measure of innovative knowledge assets. The
 key results were consistent with those reported in this
 article. Details of these analyses are available from the
 authors on request.
 2 We thank an anonymous reviewer for reminding us
 of this important point.
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 (Jensen, 1986). We measured a firm's debt ratio as
 the ratio of its total long-term debt to total assets.
 We also controlled for CEO tenure, which we
 measured by the number of years an individual had
 been the CEO of a focal firm. Adding CEO tenure as
 a control variable is particularly meaningful in this
 context because a CEO's intimate, firm-specific ex-
 perience has important implications for his or her
 ability to make efficient resource allocation deci-
 sions in a firm relying heavily on innovative
 knowledge assets (Kor & Mahoney, 2005). In the
 models in which the firm specificity of knowledge
 was a key explanatory variable, we also included
 total citations received as a control variable, to take
 into consideration differences among firms in their
 overall levels of innovation output. In addition, all
 the models controlled for time and industry fixed
 effects by incorporating dummies for the years and
 the industries at the three-digit SIC level.
 Analysis
 Our main explanatory variables included firm
 innovative knowledge assets and corporate gover-
 nance. To test the moderating effects of governance
 mechanisms on the performance implications of
 innovative knowledge assets, we included their in-
 teraction terms in the estimation model. Thus, if
 MV is the market value of a firm and A is the book
 value of this firm's total assets, the overall estima-
 tion model is expressed as follows:
 LogiMVi/Aj) = a0 + ß1 innovative knowledge^
 4- ß2 corporate governance^
 + ß3 innovative knowledge^
 X corporate governancei + ß4 controls, + e2-.
 Please note that although we have omitted time
 subscripts here to avoid unnecessary complication
 of the equation, we lagged all right-hand variables
 by one year, taking into consideration a possible
 delay before the effects of a firm's investing in
 innovation and the erection of corporate gover-
 nance mechanisms would be reflected in its eco-
 nomic performance. Our main focus of interest is
 ßa, which captures the direct effect of innovative
 knowledge on firm market value, and ß3, which
 captures the moderating effects of corporate
 governance.
 Although our primary objective was to examine
 the relationship between innovative knowledge
 and economic performance and the moderating ef-
 fects of corporate governance mechanisms on this
 relationship, it is quite likely that a firm's innova-
 tive knowledge and corporate governance influ-
 ence each o her and, in addition, hat they are both
 affected by a firm's past economic performance. For
 example, outside directors and institutional own-
 ers generally encourage long-term investments in
 R&D (David, Hitt, & Insead, 2001; Hill & Snell,
 1989; Lee & O'Neill, 2003), whereas managers tend
 to make inadequate investments in R&D, especially
 when they are rewarded on the basis of short-term
 financial measures (Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1990).
 Moreover, the use of stock options may encourage
 CEOs to make investments with high variance
 (Sanders & Hambrick, 2007). On the other hand, a
 firm's investment patterns may also affect its cor-
 porate governance system. For example, previous
 studies have suggested that certain incentive-based
 mechanisms, such as CEO compensation, are influ-
 enced by a firm's R&D intensity (Gomez-Mejia et
 al, 2003; Sanders & Hambrick, 2007). Thus, both
 innovative knowledge and corporate governance
 variables are likely to be endogenous, and it was
 possible that factors affecting these variables could
 be correlated with the dependent variable, the
 firm's economic performance.
 Therefore, we explicitly took into consideration
 the endogeneity of innovative knowledge and cor-
 porate governance mechanisms by adopting a se-
 ries of two-stage models (Greene, 2000). The first-
 stage tests had the innovative knowledge and
 corporate governance variables (at time t - 1) as the
 dependent variables, and other predictors (at time
 i-2) as independent variables. For example, for
 regressions with innovative knowledge as the de-
 pendent variable, the predictors included corporate
 governance variables, prior performance, firm size,
 firm age, debt ratio, and year and industry dum-
 mies. In addition, we included lagged innovative
 knowledge variables (at time t - 2) as instruments.
 We obtained new variables by regressing the first-
 stage models. From the first-stage results, we found
 that, largely in keeping with our predictions, the
 corporate governance and innovative knowledge
 variables were significantly intercorrelated. More-
 over, prior performance also had an influence on both
 corporate governance and innovative knowledge. The
 only exception was large outside shareholders, which
 showed no significant relationship with either inno-
 vative knowledge or prior performance.
 The second stage had economic performance (at
 time t) as the dependent variable, using the newly
 estimated variables and their interactions (at time
 t - 1) as regressors. Because each equation included
 multiple endogenous variables, we used the newly
 estimated variables to replace the original endoge-
 nous variables (Kennedy, 2003). Note that although
 the second stage of a two-stage model is generally
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 TABLE 1
 Descriptive Statistics and Correlations3
 Variables Mean s.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
 1. Market value/total assets 0.73 0.49
 Knowledge asset measures
 2. Input: R&D intensity 0.05 0.05 .31*
 3. Output: Total citations 0.39 4.05 .09* .29*
 received
 4. Firm-specific innovative 0.12 0.12 .14* .10* .02
 knowledge assets
 Corporate governance variables
 5. CEO shareholding 0.43 0.35 .24* -.05 -.01 -.01
 6. CEO contingency pay 0.72 0.19 .31* .14* .04 .10* -.02
 7. CEO duality 0.73 0.45 .03 -.15* -.06 -.00 .07 .05
 8. Outside blockholders 8.90 9.39 -.19* -.08* .01 -.02 -.04 -.08 -.02
 9. Percentage of outsiders on 68.8 15.7 .02 -.07 .04 .07 -.12* .21* .24* -.20*
 board
 Other controls
 10. Advertising intensity 0.01 0.04 .25* .04 .05 .10* .18* .13* .16* -.04 .06
 11. Firm size 2.45 1.32 .07 -.15* .03 .12* .06 .27* .22* -.21* .23* .25*
 12. Firm age 19.9 14.8 .01 .07 .03 -.06 .03 .10* .07 .11* .02 .12* .23*
 13. Firm debt 0.16 0.12 -.35* -.25* -.06 .04 .07 -.04 .05 .15* .03 .01 .09* .10*
 14. CEO tenure 6.19 7.47 .04 -.00 .03 -.12* .17* -.16* .18* -.02 -.14* .03 -.06 .15* .03
 a n = 546. Market value/total assets, a logarithm, was measured at time t. The values for all other variables were measured at time t - 1.
 * p < .05
 an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression, using
 OLS to estimate panel data could result in biased
 estimates because of the potential presence of het-
 eroskedasticity and autocorrelation (Greene, 2000).
 To address this concern, we ran the regression with
 panel-corrected standard errors (PCSEs).3
 RESULTS
 Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics and
 correlation matrix for the key variables. Overall, no
 correlations among the explanatory variables and
 control variables were high enough to raise major
 concerns about multicollinearity. As expected, all
 three measures of innovative knowledge assets
 were significantly and positively correlated with
 firm economic performance. However, the correla-
 tions between the corporate governance variables
 and economic performance were somewhat ambig-
 uous. For example, CEO equity ownership and con-
 tingency pay were positively correlated with firm
 economic p rformance, but the presence of outside
 blockholders was egatively correlated with perfor-
 mance. CEO duality and outsider representation on
 the board, however, were not significantly corre-
 lated with economic performance. We may inter-
 pret such an ambiguity as providing indirect in-
 sights into our basic theoretical position: Different
 governance mechanisms have asymmetric roles,
 and corporate governance should be examined in
 the context of a firm's resource configuration.
 To test the joint effect of firm innovative knowl-
 edge assets and corporate governance on firm per-
 formance, we followed the usual procedure of test-
 ing moderating effects by first including the key
 independent and control variables and then run-
 ning partial and full models with interactions. Be-
 cause we employed three different measures of firm
 innovative knowledge assets, we conducted three
 separate analyses. Tables 2, 3, and 4 present the
 results.4
 Table 2 confirms that the level of innovative
 knowledge input (R&D intensity) was a strong pre-
 3 Because some recent researchers (Kristensen &
 Wawro, 2003) have argued that PCSEs with lag specifi-
 cations can be problematic if observation-specific effects
 are not properly controlled for, we also performed firm
 fixed-effect estimations as a robustness test. We obtained
 consistent results for several key variables of interest,
 although with somewhat weaker effects. Detailed results
 of the firm fixed-effect estimation are available from the
 authors on request.
 4 We do not report the first-stage results because we
 want to focus on the key second-stage results, but they
 are available from the authors on request.
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 dictor of firm economic performance. The coeffi-
 cients were consistently positive and significant
 (p < .001). Therefore, Hypothesis 1 was supported
 when we used R&D intensity as the measure of firm
 innovative knowledge assets. As our main focus
 was the joint effect of firm innovative knowledge
 assets and corporate governance on firm perfor-
 mance, we were particularly interested in the coef-
 ficients on the interaction terms. Supporting Hy-
 pothesis 3, the two incentive-based governance
 variables positively moderated the relationship be-
 tween firm innovative knowledge assets and eco-
 nomic performance (p < .05 in both partial and full
 models). The results summarized in Table 2 also
 indicate the ineffectiveness of monitoring-based
 governance mechanisms. In models 4a and 6a, the
 coefficients on the interactions involving CEO du-
 ality and outside directors were both significant at
 the .01 level, with predicted signs. Largely consis-
 tent results were also present in the full model (7a).
 Similarly, the moderating effects of outside block-
 holders were negative and significant at the .1 level
 in both partial and full models (5a and 7a). These
 results are consistent with the predicted counter-
 productive effects of monitoring mechanisms.
 When we measured firm innovative knowledge
 assets by the total patent citations that a firm re-
 ceived (Table 3), the main effect of firm innovative
 knowledge on performance was also positive and
 significant (mostly at p < .05). With regard to the
 moderating effects of incentive-based governance
 mechanisms, we found both CEO shareholding and
 CEO contingency compensation to strengthen the
 relationship between firm innovative knowledge
 and performance, again providing support for Hy-
 pothesis 3. Concerning monitoring-based mecha-
 nisms, we found negative moderating effects of out-
 side directors in both the partial (6b) and full (7b)
 models (p < .05). In addition, CEO duality, which
 indicates less monitoring, showed a positive mod-
 erating effect (model 4b). The only exception was
 the moderating effects of outside blockholders,
 which we found to be insignificant (although with
 the expected negative signs). Taken together, these
 results were largely consistent with Hypothesis 2.
 As explained in the methodology section, the
 challenges to corporate governance for an innova-
 tive firm may be particularly severe when an im-
 portant portion of the firm's knowledge assets is
 firm specific. Correspondingly, we speculated that
 the asymmetric effects of incentives and monitor-
 ing might be more apparent for firms with high
 levels of firm-specific innovative knowledge assets.
 The results shown in Table 4 largely supported our
 speculations. Incentive-based governance appeared
 to strengthen the positive relationship between the
 firm specificity of knowledge assets and firm per-
 formance. In the parti l models (2c and 3c), the
 modera ing ffect  of CEO sh reholding and CEO
 contingency pay were found to be significant, at the
 .01 and .001 level , respectively. On the other
 hand, we fou d moni oring-based g vernance
 m chanisms to w aken this relationship, indicat-
 ing the cou terproductive ffects of monitoring in
 the cont xt of firms with high knowledge specific-
 ity. Spec fically, the moderatin  effects of outside
 blockholders were significant [p < .05) in both the
 partial and full models (5c and 7c), while those of
 CEO duality and u side directors were significant
 at .05 or .10. Further, all the signs of the coefficients
 were consistent with our predictions.
 Note that we have argued that compared to out-
 siders, top managers generally have greater firm-
 specific knowledge and intimate experiences that
 are critically important in innovation-intensive
 firms. In reality, however, it is not necessarily the
 case that top managers of innovative firms all per-
 fectly possess such knowledge and experiences.
 For example, it is not likely that a top manager of a
 large, diversified, and innovative company has a
 thorough understanding of the specific processes
 and technical aspects of all its businesses. For such
 firms, the degree of the information asymmetry, as
 well as the need for managerial discretion, may be
 weaker. We may also apply similar arguments to
 top managers who have short tenure with their
 firms: With limited learning opportunities, they are
 less likely to develop intimate knowledge and un-
 derstanding of the firms. Thus, the hypothesized
 moderating effects of corporate governance mecha-
 nisms may vary across firms with different sizes
 and CEO tenures.
 Therefore, as robustness tests, we conducted
 some supplementary analyses to explicitly take
 into consideration such variations. In particular,
 we divided our sample firms into subgroups ac-
 cording to firm size and CEO tenure and then reran
 all the models for each subgroup. We did not find
 any significant difference in terms of the moderat-
 ing role of corporate governance between firms
 with long CEO tenure and those with short CEO
 tenure. On the other hand, we found some differ-
 ences for the two subgroups based on firm size.
 Although the hypothesized moderating effects of
 corporate governance mechanisms still held for
 both subsamples, the effects for the large firms were
 generally weaker, in terms of both significance lev-
 els and magnitudes, than those for the small firms.5
 5 Details of these results are available from the authors
 on request.
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 Therefore, although we found some evidence that
 the extent to which a CEO has inti ate knowledge
 of his or her company varies across firms (espe-
 cially in respect to firm size), none of the findings
 could invalidate our main arguments.
 In summary, we found support for our hypothe-
 ses in most models. The various dimensions of firm
 innovative knowledge in respect to its input, out-
 put, and firm specificity were all positively associ-
 ated with a firm's economic performance measured
 by market-to-book value. In addition, we found
 both positive moderating effects of incentive-based
 governance and negative moderating effects of
 monitoring in most models.
 DISCUSSION
 This study has developed the argument that a
 firm's internal resource configuration constitutes a
 critical context for understanding the roles of vari-
 ous corporate governance mechanisms. Adopting
 governance mechanisms that can effectively ensure
 efficient deployment of firm resources will enable a
 firm to better deploy its resources and to reduce the
 gap between potential and realized economic rents.
 A key insight of this study is that the roles of the
 two broad categories of corporate governance, mon-
 itoring and incentives, are asymmetric in relation
 to deploying innovative knowledge assets. In a
 highly innovative firm, incentive-based interest
 alignment is more appropriate for motivating man-
 agers; monitoring will normally be less effective,
 and in some cases may even be counterproductive.
 Our key empirical results broadly supported these
 arguments.
 The study makes several theoretical contribu-
 tions. First, it extends previous corporate gover-
 nance research by pointing out that governance
 effectiveness is contingent not only on environ-
 mental factors such as risk and strategic complexity
 (Zajac & Westphal, 1994), but also on a firm's own
 internal resource composition. Second, although
 incentives and monitoring are usually viewed as
 either substitutes or complements (Rediker & Seth,
 1995; Tosi et al., 1997; Zajac & Westphal, 1994), we
 propose an alternative by arguing that the roles of
 the two broad governance mechanisms may be
 asymmetric when innovative knowledge is at a
 high level: Incentive-based mechanisms can in-
 crease the benefits obtained from deploying inno-
 vative knowledge assets, whereas monitoring may
 reduce them.
 This study also contributes to the resource-based
 view of the firm literature. To date, with only a few
 exceptions (Castanias & Helfat, 1991; Gottschalg &
 Zollo, 2007; Makadok, 2003; Wang & Barney,
 2006), 6 the authors of most studies following the
resource-based or knowledge-based tradition have
 generally assumed away p tential agency problems
 in the resource deployment process. However, as
 managers generally play critical roles in esource
 deployment (Castanias & Helfat, 1991, 2001; Kor &
 Mahoney, 2005), the economic rents that knowl-
 edge assets generate should be affected by the ef-
 fectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms in
 reducing agency costs. The agency problem may be
 particularly critical in highly innovative firms, as
 the same features of innovative knowledge that
 function as "isolating mechanisms" for sustaining a
 firm's competitive advantage (Rumelt, 1984), such
 as causal ambiguity and firm specificity, are also
 likely to increase information asymmetry between
 its managers and shareholders. Therefore, innova-
 tive knowledge resources and the effectiveness of a
 firm's corporate governance mechanisms should be
 considered jointly to properly understand the ac-
 tual generation of economic rents from the firm's
 r sourc  base. This study has thus filled a gap by
 explicitly examining the influence of various corpo-
 rat governance mechanisms on the value realized
 from deploying innovative knowledge resources.
 In addition to its contribution to theory, this
 study is, to our knowledge, the first empirical effort
 to test the role of corporate governance mecha-
 nisms in affecting a firm's knowledge-based advan-
 tages. Furthermore, our study provides insight into
 the organizational consequences, especially the
 p rformance effects, of corporate governance mech-
 anisms. Although quite a few studies have exam-
 ined the relationship between corporate governance
 and firm performance, the empirical evidence has
 been inconclusive overall (for reviews, see Dalton,
 Daily, Certo, and Roengpitya [2003]; Dalton et al.
 [1998]; Dalton, Johnson, and Ellstrand [1999]). Al-
 though the inconclusiveness might be attributed to
 differences in data, measurements, sampling, and
 statistical methods, this study's analysis suggests
 another possibility. Because the effectiveness of
 certain corporate governance mechanisms is con-
 tingent on the composition of a firm's resource
 base, there may be no standard criteria for what
 constitutes effective corporate governance.
 Despite its contributions to theory and empirics,
 this study has some limitations, and further re-
 search is required to advance its key arguments.
 6 None of these studies, however, explicitly examined
 the joint effects of knowledge resources and corporate
 governance in determining firm economic performance.
 Furthermore, none of the studies tested its arguments
 empirically, as we did here.
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 First, it was based on the premise that innovative
 knowledge is a primary driver of competitive ad-
 vantage. However, a firm also possesses knowledge
 assets of other kinds - those embedded, for exam-
 ple, in its marketing, social, and information sys-
 tems. These knowledge assets also play important
 roles in the firm's value creation process. Further-
 more, knowledge assets have to be combined with
 other resources, such as human, financial, and re-
 lational resources, for their potential to be realized.
 Comprehensive understanding of corporate gover-
 nance mechanisms thus requires an integrative
 consideration of other components of a firm's
 knowledge base, as well as of the relationships
 among various types of firm resources.
 Second, we have discussed and tested the role
 of incentives in facilitating the exploitation of
 knowledge assets for value creation. But incen-
 tives cannot perfectly resolve all the agency prob-
 lems in innovative firms, because these mecha-
 nisms, although helpful in achieving interest
 alignment among managers and owners in gen-
 eral, may sometimes also promote managers'
 overly aggressive investments (Sanders & Ham-
 brick, 2007) or manipulation of firm earnings
 (Zahra et al., 2005). Moreover, some innovation-
 intensive firms may face especially high risk,
 which may increase the costs of using incentive-
 based governance mechanisms (Zajac & Westphal,
 1994). It would be interesting for future studies to
 examine the specific conditions under which such
 costs are significant and the associated governance
 issues that may arise. More generally, it should be
 fruitful for future research to explore governance
 contexts in which multiple issues (e.g., information
 asymmetry and risk) may coexist and interact in
 complex ways. It may also be important for future
 studies to investigate ways of designing incentive-
 based governance mechanisms that minimize po-
 tential costs.
 Third, although we focus on a firm's internal
 resource composition as the primary context for
 understanding the roles of corporate governance
 mechanisms, we should note that a high level of
 innovative knowledge assets is not the only context
 in which information asymmetry is high and mon-
 itoring is difficult. For example, in a dynamic in-
 dustry setting, information asymmetry among man-
 agers and owners is also likely to be high, thus
 compromising the effectiveness of monitoring
 (Boyd, 1995). Therefore, we believe that it is both
 necessary and promising for future research to ex-
 amine how such external factors affect the roles of
 various governance mechanisms, as well as how
 internal and external factors may jointly affect the
 effectiveness of these mechanisms.
 Fourth, this study focused on he corporate-level
 gove nance mechanisms designed to motivate top
 managers to serve owners' interests. Such a focus is
 based on the understanding that top managers play
 a key role i  decidi g how firm resources are de-
 ployed. Future studies might investigate the moti-
vations of organization member  at other levels,
such as nonexecutive empl yees, and how their
 motivations and firm resources jointly affect firm
 p rfo mance.
 Finally, this study was to some extent limited by
 the availability of data. Although R&D expendi-
tures and patent data are reasonable proxies for the
 inputs and outputs of innovative knowledge, and
 patent citations provide rich information on knowl-
 edge flow, they still address only a narrow portion
 of a firm's innovative knowledge base. This limita-
 tion must be kept in mind when interpreting our
 regression results. Future research might use sur-
 vey or field data to explore other aspects of inno-
 vative knowledge that are not reflected in R&D
 spending or patents. In addition, because the per-
 formance measure used in this study was based on
 data covering 1996 to 1999, a period when the stock
 market experienced an abnormal boom, the market
 values of the high-tech companies might have been
 biased upward. Although the logarithm transforma-
 tion of the performance measure to some extent
 mitigates such a concern, readers should interpret
 the empirical findings with caution. We hope that
 future studies will be able to avoid this potential
 bias by employing data from other time periods that
 are not subject to this concern.
 This study has examined and found support for
 the asymmetric roles of monitoring- and incen-
 tive-based governance mechanisms in affecting
 the efficient deployment of a firm's innovative
 knowledge assets toward value creation. It dem-
 onstrates that individual governance mecha-
 nisms interact with a firm's internal resource
 composition in complex ways to jointly deter-
 mine the firm's economic performance. We hope
 that this study will be a first step toward research
 that integrates different streams of strategy and
 organizational economics thinking to advance
 understanding of the roles of corporate gover-
 nance as well as firm resources.
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